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Improving Privacy in Identity Management Systems for Health Care Scenarios 
Abstract— Privacy is a very complex and subjective concept 
with different meaning to different people. The meaning 
depends on the context. Moreover, privacy is close to the user 
information and thus, present in any ubiquitous computing 
scenario. In the context of identity management (IdM), privacy 
is gaining more importance since IdM systems deal with 
services that requires sharing attributes belonging to users’ 
identity with different entities across domains. Consequently, 
privacy is a fundamental aspect to be addressed by IdM to 
protect the exchange of user attributes between services and 
identity providers across different networks and security 
domains in pervasive computing. However, problems such as 
the effective revocation consent, have not been fully addressed. 
Furthermore, privacy depends heavily on users and 
applications requiring some degree of flexibility. This paper 
analyzes the main current identity models, as well as the 
privacy support presented by the identity management 
frameworks. After the main limitations are identified, we 
propose a delegation protocol for the SAML standard in order 
to enhance the revocation consent within healthcare scenarios.1 
Keywords-Identity management; privacy; user-centric; 
federation; anonymity; pseudonymity; delegation; health care. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
 Privacy is a very complex and subjective concept, since 
it has a meaning different for every individual. Privacy is 
related to the sensitiveness of the people and the context in 
which the information is used. The digital age we live in 
imposes scenarios in which users’ information is 
extensively collected and distributed to make it available 
wherever the users are. Pervasive computing and social 
immersion have made users active broadcasters of their own 
life. This fact is extremely worrying, especially for young 
people, despite they have born into technology (i.e. “digital 
natives”). They are no conscious about the consequences 
when it comes to spread their personal information all over 
the Internet. Nevertheless, the origin of this situation can be 
aligned to the lack of comprehensive privacy frameworks. 
Hence, the privacy issues risen when distributing their 
information are considered by users minimal tradeoffs 
against the benefit of being connected, since there is no way 
to manage privacy appropriately. However, individuals want 
to have control of their information. The improper and 
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unsecured management of such attributes may lead to 
attacks, frauds, and identity misuse, as identity information 
can be exploited whenever authentication and authorization 
based on those identity attributes are required. Malicious 
parties collect sensitive identity attributes of individuals and 
use them to impersonate users. 
 Identity Management (IdM) systems provide frameworks 
for sharing users identity attributes among different entities, 
and can be used to keep data under users’ control. For that 
reason, IdM systems are the cornerstone of security systems, 
because they can be used to keep user confidence while 
preserve privacy in an appropriate way. Such confidence is 
preserved when users’ attributes are exchanged between 
service providers (SPs) and identity providers (IdPs) across 
different networks and security domains. Currently, there 
are several approaches to identity management being the 
most popular the federated and user-centric approaches. 
These approaches provide many services as the popular 
Single Sign On (SSO) across multiple trusted domains. SSO 
allows users of one domain to securely access resources of 
another domain seamlessly, requiring no redundant login 
processes. Both approaches have benefits and shortcomings, 
for instance, the federated model has scalability issues 
which the user-centric model solves, but both of them can 
be used for a better privacy management.  
However, current IdM systems by themselves have 
several problems that should be solved to handle privacy 
adequately; for instance, the problem of revoking consent is 
not covered by any of the aforementioned identity 
management approaches. Revoking consent is part of the 
privacy rules [1] in health care. This property consists of 
revoking access to personal data that had been already 
shared. The privacy requirements shall depend on users and 
applications, requiring flexibility to handle different 
application domains. In this article, we focus on the privacy 
concept within identity management systems (IdM) in 
ubiquitous environments. Particularly, we have selected 
health care scenarios since they are among the most 
sensitive scenarios. Our privacy aware identity system 
implements an effective consent revocation with an 
innovative event management that can be used in other 
scenarios. For this purpose, we assume that the development 
of patients care can be broken down into events. These 
events describe a specific situation and can be related to 
some participant entities. We propose a delegation protocol, 
which issues a sleepyhead credential containing user’s 
attributes and access privileges that have been granted 
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beforehand but that are kept latent. To use these attributes, 
an activation process is necessary. Our solution proposes 
events to awake dormant privileges or part of them and 
incorporates several new features that allow better 
scalability. For instance, emergency services are the entities 
which manage trust indirectly by emitting events that will be 
used to determine which participants can access to user’s 
medical information. The rest of this paper is structured as 
follows: section II presents the main privacy properties and 
current identity management approaches, identifying the 
advantages and drawbacks of each one in terms of privacy. 
Section III provides a comparative analysis of the privacy 
support in identity management systems. Moreover, open 
issues and related works regarding privacy in IdM are 
described in this section. Then, section IV explains our 
delegation protocol to enhance privacy in health care 
scenarios. Section V describes implementation issues. And 
finally, Section VI summarizes our work and presents the 
main conclusions and future lines. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As mentioned before, privacy is complex to handle and 
needs to cope with different sensitivities that depend, among 
others, on the context in which the information is used. 
Privacy comprises several subtopics as anonymity, 
pseudonymity, unobservability and unlinkability that might 
have different definitions in the literature [2]. In this paper, 
we focus on privacy within identity management systems 
(IdM). Thus, this section presents definition of the main 
privacy principles, such as anonymity, pseudonymity, 
unobservability and unlinkability. Likewise, we discuss how 
these concepts are addressed in identity management 
systems. 
A. Principles of pivacy 
• Anonymity: can be defined as the state of being not 
identifiable within a set of subjects or entities, also 
called the anonymity set. Another definition 
provided by the Common Criteria [3], asserts that 
this property ensures that a user may use a resource 
or service without disclosing the user identity. 
Cryptographic techniques, such as encryption, do not 
guarantees anonymity since an observer could 
analyze traffic, eavesdrop the sender of the message 
and follow the message up to the receiver, 
establishing certain relationships without having 
access to the unencrypted message. Therefore, IdM 
systems must provide additional mechanisms, such 
as opaque identifiers to prevent such inference. 
• Pseudonymity: is the use of pseudonyms as 
identifiers. An advantage of pseudonymity 
technologies is that accountability for misbehavior 
can be enforced. Thus, this enables Identity 
providers, that can link identifiers to real identities, 
to take appropriate decisions when a user commits a 
crime or offense in an IdM scenario. 
• Unlinkability: ensures that a user may consume 
multiple resources or services without letting other 
entities to link these multiple resource or service 
accesses together. In particular, this property allows 
users to interact with multiple organizations (SPs or 
IdPs), each of them able to map a user to a given 
identity, using different identities. Moreover, IdM 
systems should provide mechanisms to prevent 
collaborating organizations from linking a given user 
profile at one organization with the same user profile  
at another. While it is relatively easy to let users to 
create and maintain multiple identities for 
themselves, ensuring that these identities remain 
unlikable is not straightforward. In particular, there is 
always a risk since patterns of usage and attribute 
values might leak enough information to link the 
identities of a given user. 
• Unobservability: permits a user to access resources 
or services avoiding other entities, especially third 
parties, to observe that the resource or service is 
being used. Regarding identity management, traffic 
analysis is a well-known example, which tries to 
violate this principle. 
 
B. Current Identity Models 
According to Josang [4] the fundamental privacy 
protection principle is that exposure of personal information 
should be minimized. If we transfer this concept to identity 
management approaches, this means that, the fewer parties 
involved in the management of the identity information the 
better. Nevertheless, achieving a good degree of privacy 
implies observing every of the aforementioned privacy 
principles. Furthermore, although the property of anonymity 
is one of the four principles of privacy, IdM systems should 
support mechanisms to break the anonymity of a user for the 
purpose of analysis or evidence under certain circumstances 
(e.g a criminal user, lawful interception). For clarity, we 
introduce here the main actors in an identity management 
scenario, that are: 1) the Principal, or the End User, who has 
a particular digital identity and interacts (usually via an user 
agent) with SPs; 2) the Service Provider, which provides 
services and takes decisions based on the identity 
information provided by a third party (IdP) about a 
particular subject, 3) the Identity Provider that authenticates 
users, manage identity information and shares identity 
information with various SPs upon user request. In this 
section, we briefly introduce identity management systems 
with an special focus on privacy. However, other aspects as 
usability and scalability are also considered when assessing 
IdM approaches. 
1) Federated Identity Model: The identity federation model 
can be defined as a set of standards, technologies and 
agreements, that enable SPs to recognize user identities and 
entitlements from other SPs or IdPs. Thus, this approach is 
based on groups of SPs and IdPs that have a pre-existing 
mutual trust relationship. Consequently, specifications, such 
as Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [5], 
recommend using Public Key Infrastucture (PKI) [6] for 
establishing trust relationships. Regarding the terminology of 
Liberty Alliance [7], the above groups are called members 
of the circle of trust (see Fig. 1).  
Fig. 1. Federated model scenario. A user, after a successful authentication, 
can access services from any service provider within the circle of trust. For 
instance, booking a flight, then renting a car, and finally buying tickets for 
a show. Note that the IdP stores identity information on behalf of the user. 
Identity federation provides several services as Single 
Sign On across multiple federated domains, which allows 
users of one domain to securely access resources of another 
domain seamlessly, requiring no redundant user login 
processes. Other benefits that federated models bring are 
user attribute exchange, user account provisioning, 
entitlement management and personalized service 
provisioning. Nevertheless, as far as usability and scalability 
are concerned, this model has several drawbacks. For 
instance, it creates legal and technical complexity since to 
be part of the circle of trust, an entity would need to sign a 
legal agreement. In addition, federated model presents 
scalability issues when deployed in dynamic open 
environments due to rigidity and staticity of the agreements 
between federated organizations. A comparative analysis of 
the underlying trust mechanisms of the current frameworks 
for federated identity management can be found in [8]. 
From a privacy perspective, the federated identity approach 
has both advantages and disadvantages. Regarding its 
advantages, it allows users to have multiple identities within 
a given domain. Similarly, the federated model enables an 
entity to have different identities or identifiers in different 
domains. These features make possible, for example, the 
same identity to have one identifier as patient in a health 
care domain and another identifier as employee or student in 
another domain. Moreover, from the SP perspective, the 
identifier mapping permits different SPs to refer to the same 
user through different identifiers. Moreover, whereas the 
IdP needs to know the “real world” identity of a user, this 
user identity can be anonymous for a specific SP, which 
provides additional privacy protection. However, it must be 
noted that users never participate in the trust establishment 
process so they need to believe that the IdP will behave 
honestly. 
In regard to the drawbacks of this kind of identity model, 
the main issue is that the privacy protection depends on the 
privacy policy and the adherence of the IdP or SP to the 
policy, which can be a threat. For instance, different SPs 
could be able to match personal information of the same 
user because of the mapping between identifiers. In order to 
prevent this problem, identity frameworks such as, SAML 
and Liberty advise the use of pairwise, directional opaque 
identifiers. 
2) User-centric Identity Model: The user-centric model 
places the user in the middle of a transaction, thereby this 
approach gives users total control over their identities as 
well as control over authentication an attribute exchange 
processes. In this way, the user is no longer aside of the trust 
establishment process. However, this does not mean that 
users should approve every transaction, but that data always 
flow through the user’s identity agent. This approach indeed 
empowers users and follows better than the federated model 
the philosophy of minimal disclosure defined by Josang. 
Moreover, from the usability perspective, the user-centric 
identity model, solves scalability problems and provides 
similar services, as SSO, whereas is compatible with the 
federated model. 
In regard to privacy, this model has both advantages and 
drawbacks. It introduces the concept of meta-idp, which 
allows users to assert several kinds of claims: user-
generated and provider-generated claims. These user 
electronic identities are typically stored in user’s equipment, 
such as his mobile phone. User-centric identity technologies 
such as InfoCards [9], allow users to select among their 
multiple identities through identity selectors to identify 
itself to a service. Regarding identity selectors, in [10] two 
types of information cards are specified: Personal or Self-
Issued (claims about the user itself, e.g. phone number, e-
mail address, web address); and a Managed Information 
Cards, issued by Identity Providers. The latter can be 
auditing, non-auditing, or auditing-optional to accommodate 
the needs of different business models. The identity cards 
are metaphors of real id cards whereas the identity selector 
mimics a wallet. However, it is worth mentioning here that, 
in the case of provider-generated claims, the user must rely 
on the IdP honesty, as occurred in the federated model (see 
Fig. 2).  
The main disadvantage of user-centric approach is that it 
requires a complex design in order to avoid privacy and 
trust issues with authentication and attribute verification. In 
order to assist the reader in understanding this aspect, we 
provide the following example. If we consider a real world 
example in which Bob may show his driver licence to a 
bartender to prove he is above the legal drinking age, we 
can see that Bob is able to use his Id card without the Id 
card issuer’s knowledge. However, if we transfer this 
example to a user-centric scenario, trust and privacy 
problems emerge, because no SP is obliged to believe Bob 
when he asserts that he is old enough to legal buy alcoholic 
beverages. In this sense, it is necessary that a trusted third 
party corroborates the above statement by using a provider-
generated card.  
 
Fig. 2. User centric model. A user can access services from any service 
provider accepting his/her credentials. For instance, booking a flight, then 
renting a car and finally buying tickets for a show. Note that the 
information is provided always by the user. 
 
III. PRIVACY SUPPORT: A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
In this section, we compare the privacy support that several 
federated and user-centric frameworks have, in terms of 
language support for privacy policies, anonymity, 
pseudonyms, if they reflect how unlinkability can be 
achieved, and revoking consent. We focus our comparative 
analysis on the SSO profile, because this characteristic is 
common to the two identity management technologies 
described below. In this section, some proposals that seek to 
address various privacy issues will be presented, as well as 
some open privacy challenges in IdM systems. 
    SAML is a federated specification, which supports two 
types of identifiers to refer to users: transient or one-time 
identifiers and persistent identifiers. On the one hand, 
transient identifiers ensure that a user anonymously accesses 
a service during SSO process, since these identifiers are 
created for use during a session and they are destroyed at the 
end. Thus, correlation between identifiers is avoided. On the 
other hand, the persistent identifiers provide a persistent 
federation and remain active until they are explicitly 
deleted. The permanent federation implies an account 
linkage process, which relates two accounts associated to a 
user in different SPs. Note that it is recommended to use 
different pseudonyms for each SP, in order to avoid 
different SPs belonging to the same federation to infer user 
behaviour. 
     SAML supports partial anonymity in the sense that the 
IdP itself is able to know which user corresponds to each 
identity. Indeed, SAML does not provide a solution from 
preventing IdPs from tracking user’s visits to SP. Regarding 
privacy policies, this technology allows to obtain a 
principal’s consent or describe specific attributes to satisfy 
requirements to preserve privacy within a health care 
community, through the XSPA-SAML profile [11]. 
Nevertheless, SAML standard states that privacy must be 
considered, but concrete decisions are left to the 
implementers. 
    In regard to the Liberty Alliance federated model, it 
defines an Identity Governance Framework (IGF) [12], 
which enables the creation of policies or contracts between 
an Attribute Provider (AP) and a SP. Therefore, IGF 
includes two XML syntaxes: Attribute Requirement Markup 
Language (CARML) and Attribute Authority Policy 
Markup Language (AAPML). Moreover, IGF defines basic 
privacy constraints such as usage, storage, propagation and 
display of identity data. Thus, an attribute provider creates 
statements to access and use protected attributes. At the 
same time, a SP may specify whether the requested 
attributes will be discarded after usage. Furthermore, the SP 
could request to modify the data or forward it to another SP. 
However, in [13], Liberty proposes a multi-level policy 
approach, which does not consider any specification or rules 
for storing user preferences in a manner that would facilitate 
the SPs to match the privacy policy levels in the attribute 
request with the levels in user’s preferences. As SAML, 
Liberty offers long-term and one-time pseudonyms. 
Correspondingly, it must be noted that this specification 
only allows a user to have one long-term pseudonym per SP 
to prevent user tracking across different transactions. This is 
a big limitation. In addition, it does not protect against SPs 
cooperating to share user pseudonyms in order to track users 
behaviour. In order to overcome these problems, a set of 
rules and recommendations are proposed in [14]. 
In the case of InfoCards, it includes authenticated 
anonymity and pseudonymity, as well as the ability to 
express privacy policies of SPs or Relying Parties (RPs). 
This user-centric framework is characterized by defining a 
message flow that eliminates direct communication between 
the IdP and the SP. Moreover, InfoCards allows the identity 
selector to encrypt the SP identity to prevent the IdP from 
learning the SP identity when it receives a request for a 
token. Note that, this identity selector applies user-centric 
principles in collecting user consent. Both features together 
are necessary to ensure that an IdP cannot learn which SPs 
visits a given principal. The SAML Enhanced Client Proxy 
profile (ECP) is similar, but currently it only has the first 
characteristic. However, some IdPs may require knowledge 
of the RPs identity before issuing a requested token, or even 
if the IdP cannot learn the visited SPs, user profiling is 
possible by colluding parties. 
Regarding OpenID, privacy considerations are not 
addressed in the main specification and SSO can be 
performed between previously unknown parties without any 
configuration. Thus, there is no trust model; the protocol 
operates in accordance with the trust-all-comers philosophy. 
Although for some services requiring no verification this 
model may be sufficient, this mechanism is too simple and 
unsafe for many other applications, leading to privacy 
breach. Nevertheless, an OpenID extensions called PAPE 
(Provider Authentication Policy Extension) [15], provides 
the means for a RP to request previously agreed upon 
authentication policies being applied by the OpenID 
Provider and for an OpenID Provider to inform an RP what 
policies will be used. Therefore, the decision to trust can be 
based in the knowledge of the authentication mechanism 
employed. Hence, with this user-centric framework, RPs 
must decide for themselves which providers are trustworthy, 
being able to enforce policies to the OpenID Providers 
response. 
In Table I we summarize the main privacy features of 
each identity framework. To conclude, all the analyzed 
technologies typically handle privacy by means of 
pseudonyms which can be transient or permanent. The only 
exception is OpenID, which follows the trust-and-accept-all-
comers principle and privacy is not addressed. Moreover, it 
must be noted that, InfoCards and SAML ECP profile 
address better the principle of minimal disclosure. However, 
the problem of revoking consent is covered by none of the 
above IdM technologies. Thus, if personal data has been 
already shared, the effective revocation of consent implies 
an important challenge to address. For instance, it requires 
dynamic updates to sticky policies. Other proposals, as PKI-
based solutions, attempt to solve the problem by issuing 
tokens that expire after some time. However, these 
approaches have problems since the token duration is very 
short so, when another entity needs to use this credential, it 
has to ask the user for permission again because the time has 
expired. On the contrary, if the token duration is longer than 
necessary, user’s sensitive information may be exposed to 
entities which should not have access to that information. 
As far as the attribute exchange between different trust 
domains is concerned, current specifications focus on trust 
relationship between SPs and IdPs assuming that trust 
between users and providers are implicit. However, privacy 
policies that allow users to understand privacy implications 
(in terms of attribute exchange or delegation between 
different security domains) and to give their consent are 
poorly defined, complex to implement or out of the scope. 
Current identity frameworks support partial anonymity, 
since authorities, as the IdP, provides obfuscated identifiers. 
In [16] a ring signature and a SAML extension are 
proposed, thereby a user can sign a message on behalf of a 
group and the IdP can verify the signature and confirm that 
the user belongs to a specific group without revealing user’s 
identity. However, this proposal has several privacy 
problems. For instance, the IdP should provide a list of 
candidates who have similar access rights to the users in 
order to create the ring, which affects group members’ 
privacy. In addition, there is no intervention possible, so if a 
member of the group commits a crime, the IdP cannot 
determine the identity of the perpetrator. The approach in 
[17] includes homomorphic encryption techniques to enable 
the IdP or SP to know the result of the aggregated 
information from a user group, without knowing users 
individually. This mechanism is used for maintaining 
privacy of user’s opinions in a reputation protocol. 
However, the proposed distributed architecture has 
scalability issues which could be overcome by means of 
caching mechanisms. 
 
 
TABLE I. SUMMARY OF PRIVACY FEATURES IN IDENTITY MANAGEMENT 
IdM Technology Anonymity and Pseudonymity 
Unlinkability and 
unobservabity Privacy Languages Revoking consent 
Federated model 
(SAML/ID-FF) 
Partial anonymity (IdP 
knows user identity). No 
solution from preventing 
IdPs from tracking is 
provided. 
Transient and permanent 
identifiers. Different 
pseudonyms for each SP 
recommended. Confidentiality 
of transaction recommended.  
Cryptographic mechanisms do 
not prevent from traffic 
analysis attacks. 
The XSPA-SAML profile 
enables to obtain user’s 
consent and describe 
attributes 
to preserve privacy in health 
care. An identity governance 
framework is defined. 
Not addressed 
User-centric Model 
( InfoCards) 
Included in the 
specification 
Message flow eliminates direct 
communication IdP-SP. 
Identity selector may encrypt 
SP identity to prevent the IdP 
from learning. 
Allow to express privacy 
policies of RPs. 
Not addressed 
Hybrid Model 
(OpenID) 
Not addressed Not addressed  Not addressed Not addressed 
IV. SLEEPYHEAD CREDENTIAL-BASED 
DELEGATION 
As we have mentioned before, the effective consent 
revocation is an open privacy challenge in identity 
management systems. Consider a health care scenario as 
depicted in Fig. 3. An emergency service should attend Alice 
because she has suffered an accident. On the one hand, in 
this scenario attribute exchange and delegation process 
cannot be completely user-centric, since in cases of serious 
accidents the user cannot be able to give her consent. On the 
other hand, federated models raise privacy concerns since 
medical records may be available to every entity within the 
circle of trust, even if there is no emergency. 
    Effective consent revocation is difficult due to complexity 
of the management (of entities, credentials, and privacy 
rules), scalability, and control of long-lived delegation 
chains. In this section, we describe our proposal that 
consists of a delegation protocol, which issues a sleepyhead 
credential (SC) to overcome the above limitations. The 
sleepyhead credential contains user’s attribute identifiers 
(i.e. her medical history), as well as access privileges, which 
have been granted to beforehand but they are latent. Thus, to 
use the aforementioned attributes or privileges, an activation 
process is necessary. Particularly, within health care 
scenarios, we model patients’ life cycle as event-driven. 
Events are fired by trusted entities when specific 
circumstances are met, and routed to required entities. We 
propose using these events to awake the dormant privileges 
or part of them. Moreover, in order to prevent unauthorized 
access, we require some entities (like the IdP1 in Fig. 3) to 
use a Privacy Engine, responsible for analyzing events and 
activating the strictly needed attributes and privileges for 
each event. 
A. Hypotheses 
In the following, we describe the assumptions on which our 
sleepyhead credential-based delegation protocol has been 
built. We assume the existence of an event engine, which 
uses the SIP-Specific Event Notify [18] specification to send 
events to entities (by means of broadcast or to registered 
entities). Also note that, both SPs and IdPs can take the role 
of subscribers and notifiers, either subscribing to different 
events or notifying them. As regards emergency services, 
they are responsible for notifying events to the subscribed 
entities. In order to clarify this last aspect, consider that some 
parts of the patient’s medical history reside in different IdPs 
and depending on the required treatment, it is necessary to 
consult several parts of the medical record, thereby an IdP 
can act as both client (subscriber) and server (notifier). In 
addition, communication between any two parties is 
confidential, and messages exchanged between them are 
transported over HTTPS. 
On the other hand, note that it is necessary to take into 
account security considerations regarding SIP SUBSCRIBE 
and NOTIFY messages, given the high sensitivity of health 
care data considered in the proposal. Therefore, both 
subscription and notification messages must be 
authenticated and authorized, for instance to prevent the 
participating entities from subscribing multiple times or 
redirecting the subscription of their neighbor either 
intentionally or accidentally. In this sense, SIP can use 
different security mechanisms such as HTTP Digest or TLS. 
We recommend TLS for secure and encrypted SIP 
communications. Besides, all users utilize transient 
identifiers in order to preserve their anonymity while 
enabling the IdPs the accountability enforcement in case of 
user’s misbehavior, according to the main principles of 
privacy specified in II. Essentially, the hypotheses 
concerning secure network communication may be satisfied 
by the existence of a PKI. 
   Finally, we assume an underlying trust relationship based 
on PKI for entities belonging to different domains. 
B. Description of the Health Care Scenario 
    In our health care scenario, Alice can authenticate 
through a credential to the hospital that stores her medical 
history (IdP1). Alice suffers an accident. The emergency 
service (SP1) requests access to Alice’s medical records in 
order to send them to an ambulance company (SP2), in 
another trusted domain, which needs to access to the 
patient’s medical records to provide her the appropriate 
treatment. Thus, as events happen, they are notified to the 
involved parties, such as the medical record service (IdP1) 
and the ambulance (SP2) which treats Alice. So the IdP1 
may know which ambulance should be allowed to access to 
medical histories. 
Furthermore, each event describes a purpose, which 
enables to filter the access to certain parts of medical history 
according to a policy. Thus, in this example the following 
events could be distinguished: 
• Event 1: There is an accident. SP1 notifies this event 
and calls all ambulance services close to the area. 
•  Event 2: An ambulance from SP2 arrives on the 
scene and requests access to Alice’s medical history. 
It must give a description of the severity of problem 
to allow IdP1 to give access to certain parts of 
Alice’s medical records or her full history. To 
illustrate this, consider that Alice has broken her 
femur, losses her consciousness and needs surgery. 
In this case, access to the whole medical record 
could be provided. However, if the problem is 
minor, as a sprained ankle, SP2 is allowed to access 
only to trauma and drug allergies sections of the 
history. 
• Event 3: Although not depicted in the Figure 3, 
another possible event would be fired if Alice is 
taken to hospital (SP3). The hospital diagnoses her 
with trauma during the triage and determines that 
Alice requires an operation. Therefore, a doctor 
belonging to (SP3) could read Alice’s records. 
    It must be noted that, events may be fired by authorized 
entities, like the emergency service or a hospital urgency 
service. Likewise, events happen asynchronously and the 
duration of each event lasts from the beginning of the event 
itself (t1) until another event arrives (t2) whose 
circumstances and context have changed; and it may contain 
new requested attributes or privileges. Thus, certain 
attributes or privileges previously granted will be 
deactivated and new components of the sleepyhead 
credential will be activated. 
 
Fig. 3. Health care event-based scenario accross different domains. 
C. SAML-compliant Sleepyhead Credential 
The SC has been defined as a new SAML assertion, 
according to the SAML proposal for delegation information 
defined in [19]. Thus, the sleepyhead credential is created 
with the following tuple: 
SC = {AttP1, AttP2, …, AttPn} (1)
    Where each component AttPi represents attributes and 
access privileges, which have been granted to beforehand but 
they are latent. In Fig. 4, we can see the structure of a  
SAML-compliant SC, which includes the following elements 
for delegation restriction: EventFilter, which defines 
filters that will be used by the Privacy Engine to analyze the 
received events and decide whether any attribute(s) may be 
activated; the TrustedEventSources, which contains 
entity names whose events active the credential; and the 
EntityMedicalRepository, which specifies the 
location and distribution of attributes and medical records. 
   The IdPs will be the entities responsible for storing and 
managing the sleepyhead credentials, since as we have 
mentioned before, in cases of serious accident, the user may 
not be able to provide his credentials. 
D. Privacy Engine     
It is responsible for activating the latent attributes and 
privileges (following the principle of minimal disclosure) 
depending on the different event filters and the defined 
privacy policies. To this end, it analyzes the different 
elements which compose each event (i.e. issuer, situation, 
degree of severity), as well as their purposes (i.e. health care 
treatment, operation, emergency treatment) and applies the 
corresponding privacy policy. This policy includes the set of 
consent directives and other privacy conditions (i.e. object 
filtering, user, role, and purpose) that constrain enforcement. 
     On the other hand, the Privacy Engine includes an audit 
service for events, attribute activation, and access control 
decisions. It monitors how user data is being used without 
compromising user’s identity. To accomplish this, the fields 
that are logged must be able to show the auditor  what 
information about the user is being accessed without 
divulging the actual information. Note that, this audit 
service itself will not physically prevent privacy breaches 
from occurring but it can act as a deterrent and allow 
individuals and regulatory bodies to monitor how data is 
being shared in order to prevent from linking and traffic 
analysis attacks. 
 
Fig. 4. Sleepyhead Credential Assertion. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES 
In order to evaluate our proposal, an identity 
management infrastructure has been deployed using a C 
library called Lasso [20], which implements the full SAML 
2.0/ID-FF stack. The IdP, called Authentic [21], has been 
developed from it. This library uses OpenSSL as underlying 
cryptographic library and Apache2 as the web server. 
Regarding SPs, we have also used ZXID [22]. Furthermore, 
with the aim to simulate the system of medical events 
through the SIP-Notify-Event specification, we have 
deployed a Sailfin Application Server [23] and implemented 
a set of modules that handle the associated logic to subscribe 
or register events, as well as send appropriate notifications to 
each of the participating entities. Exchanged messages 
contain an Event header that indicates the event type to 
which the entity is subscribed. As for the Expire header, it 
specifies subscription duration. Finally, event descriptions 
are sent through XML messages embedded in SIP requests. 
     Based on the described infrastructure we have introduced 
the modifications proposed in section IV. For this purpose, 
we are developing the Privacy Engine module, including the 
functionality to receive a structure, which represents the 
event filter and a hash table, which contains the event 
sources. Thus, this building block is in charge of checking 
that each of the sources that caused the event is in its 
Dynamic Trust List (DTL) [8]; and making findings relating 
to conditions or restrictions in the event filter in order to 
determine what attributes or privileges can be activated. 
Therefore, the IdP has been modified to use the new privacy 
functionality. On the other hand, we have extended the 
Lasso library, defining a new structure that represents the 
new SAML assertion, as well its different fields and 
associated attributes. Such assertion is exchanged through 
SAML messages. In addition, it must be noted that the SP 
and IdP have been extended by implementing the SAML-
based delegation protocol. Thus, we are currently working 
in order to integrate the new software components with the 
SIP-based event system to offer a really enhanced privacy 
experience and apply audit services for events. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
We have reviewed and analyzed the main identity models 
and current frameworks to preserve privacy in identity 
management systems, identifying its main drawbacks. 
Current approaches assume previously established trust 
between users and providers, support partial anonymity, 
define privacy policies poorly, or are complex to implement. 
Another important challenge in the context of privacy in IdM 
system is the effective consent revocation. However, privacy 
is a very complex and subjective concept, and depending on 
the users and applications of the IdM system, privacy 
requirements may vary. Thus, we have proposed a delegation 
protocol based on SAML, to overcome the challenge of 
effective revocation consent within health care scenarios. 
    Our solution proposes using events to awake dormant 
privileges or part of them and it incorporates new features 
that allow better scalability, since the emergency services are 
the entities which manage indirectly trust. Moreover, we 
have described some implementation details that we are 
currently facing. It must be noted that, the usage of the 
system also affects privacy and should be present in users 
consents. Besides, the auditing processes should verify that 
the design and assumptions regarding future usage matches 
its actual usage. 
    We shall test this last issue on real health care scenarios 
in order to demonstrate how the privacy is managed by the 
system actors. Likewise, how a sleepyhead 
credential is revoked itself, ending with the permissions 
must be analyzed. We shall take into account different 
privacy requirements for identity attributes, including 
biometric and health care data. Further research could be 
done to contemplate how to keep user’s privacy during the 
exchange and sharing of attributes in different trust 
domains, also considering usability. 
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